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Market power of the input supplier, technology transfer and consumer welfare

1. Introduction
It is usually believed that market power of the input supplier, charging a linear price, is detrimental for the consumers, since it creates the “double marginalisation” problem, thus creating a concern for antitrust authorities.​[1]​ Hirsch (1997) and Shrek (2009) show that the presence of a labour union, which is a natural candidate for charging a linear input price, raises wages paid by the firms and makes the consumers worse off compared to the situation with no labour union. We show in this paper that the above view may not be true if the final goods producers can adopt strategies to reduce rent extraction by the input supplier.
In what follows, considering the input supplier as a labour union, we show in Section 3 that the presence of a labour union induces a monopolist final goods producer to license its technology to a foreign firm facing a competitive labour market.​[2]​ The licenser and the licensee compete in an international market. Product-market competition following technology transfer reduces output of the licenser and therefore, the wage paid by the licenser. Both these effects tend to increase consumer surplus under labour union compared to the situation where the monopolist producer faces no labour union (or faces a competitive labour market), since the absence of a labour union may not induce technology licensing.​[3]​
We extend our analysis in Section 4 with a duopoly market structure. In this situation, technology licensing occurs under both labour union and no labour union. However, the presence of a labour union may induce the licenser to charge a less distortionary technology licensing contract compared to the situation with no labour union, which, in turn, may make the consumers better off under labour union compared to no labour union. More specifically, the presence of a labour union may make the consumers better off by changing the royalty only licensing contract under no labour union to either a fixed-fee only licensing contract or a two-part tariff licensing contract, consisting of a positive fixed-fee and an output royalty, under a labour union. Hence, the presence of a labour union may reduce the marginal cost of the licensee, although it increases the marginal cost of the licenser. Consumers are better off in the presence of a labour union compared to no labour union if the market size is not large and the labour union’s preference for wage over employment is moderate.
Thus, our paper provides the insight that if an input purchaser increases product-market competition to reduce the adverse effects of the input supplier’s market power, a lower buyer power may make the consumers better off, which is in contrast to the usual belief that a higher buyer power increases consumer surplus by reducing the input price.​[4]​
It is worth noting that although we consider the input supplier as a labour union, which may put different weights on wage (i.e., the input price) and employment (i.e., the amount of input supplied), our results hold also for a profit maximizing input supplier considering the same weight on input price and the quantity sold.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and mentions the contribution of our paper with respect to the existing literature. Sections 3 and 4 consider respectively the situations of monopoly and duopoly market structures. Section 5 discusses the implications of some alternative assumptions on bargaining. Section 6 concludes. Mathematical details are relegated to the Appendix.

2. Related literature
Our paper contributes to the literature by extending and bridging the lines of research following Kabiraj and Marjit (2003) and Poddar and Sinha (2010). Considering a fixed-fee licensing contract, Kabiraj and Marjit (2003) explain that tariff policies of the importing countries increase the cost of the foreign firms and induce the foreign firms to license their technologies to their domestic counter parts, thus making the consumers better off by increasing cost efficiency.​[5]​ Poddar and Sinha (2010) show how the technology licensing contract from a high-cost firm to a low-cost firm is being affected by the cost difference between the licenser and the licensee.
In contrast to Poddar and Sinha (2010), the presence of the labour union in our paper makes the cost difference between the licenser and the licensee endogenous, which, in turn, affects the optimal licensing contract. The incentive to reduce the wage cost induces a monopolist to license its technology to a competitor or it induces a duopolist to use a less distortionary two-part tariff technology licensing contract, consisting of a fixed-fee and an output royalty, compared to the situation with no labour union.​[6]​ Moreover, in contrast to them, we show the effects of a labour union on the consumers.
In contrast to Kabiraj and Marjit (2003), we consider an optimal technology licensing contract, consisting of a fixed-fee and an output royalty, no government policy intervention and imperfect input market condition due to the presence of a labour union. Our analysis shows how the presence of a labour union may make the consumers better off either by encouraging a monopolist to license the technology or by encouraging a duopolist to design a less distortionary licensing contract compared to the situation with no labour union.​[7]​
To the best of our knowledge, there is only another paper by Mukherjee and Wang (2013), showing the favourable effect of labour unions on consumers. However, our paper differs from theirs in some important ways. First, Mukherjee and Wang (2013) show that the presence of a labour union may make the consumers better off by attracting entry of an independent firm that is significantly technologically superior compared to the incumbent firm. In contrast, there is no entry of firms in Section 4 of our analysis. Instead, the effects of a labour union on the technology licensing contract are responsible for our results. There is a technology licensing induced entry in Section 3 of this paper, yet, in our analysis, the licensee (which is the entrant) is technologically inferior compared to the licenser (which is the incumbent), whereas the entrant in Mukherjee and Wang (2013) needs to be significantly technologically superior compared to the incumbent. Hence, Mukherjee and Wang (2013) is more applicable in industries with leapfrogging of technologies where the new firms come with better technologies. In contrast, our paper is more applicable in industries with technology leaders.
Arya and Mittendorf (2006) and Mukherjee et al. (2008) show that the presence of the input suppliers with market power may induce a monopolist final goods producer to license its technology to create product-market competition. However, our paper differs from those papers in many important ways. First, unlike our paper, those papers neither examine the effects of the market power of the input suppliers on the technology licensing contracts between the established oligopolists nor look at the effects of the market power of the input suppliers on the consumers in comparison to a competitive labour market. Second, in those papers, the input suppliers give the same weights on the input price and the amount of input sold. However, in our paper, the preference of the labour unions on wage and employment can be different. Finally, in those papers, the licenser and the licensee face unions with the same bargaining power. In contrast, the licenser in our paper faces a labour union while the licensee faces a competitive labour market.

3. Monopoly final goods producer
Consider two countries, called domestic and foreign. There is a world market consisting of these countries. There is a firm, firm 1, in the domestic country, which has a patented technology for the product. We assume that production requires only labour and firm 1 requires  () workers to produce one unit of the output. We assume that the competitive wage in the domestic country is c.
We consider two labour market situations in the domestic country. 
1.	Competitive labour market: In this situation, the domestic labour market is perfectly competitive and the equilibrium domestic wage is equal to the competitive wage, c.
2.	Unionised labour market: In this situation, a labour union in the domestic country sets the wage, w, to maximise its utility , where  is employment and , , (resp. ) shows the labour union’s preference for wage (resp. employment). We consider a right-to-manage model of labour union, where the labour union has full bargaining power in determining the wage and the firm hires workers according to its requirement. This assumption not only allows us to show the effects of a labour union in a simplest possible analytical way, it also creates the maximum possible distortion created by the labour union.​[8]​ If , the objective function of the union will be like an objective function of a profit maximising input supplier.​[9]​ 

We assume that firm 1 has the option to license its technology to a foreign firm, firm 2. For simplicity, we consider that firm 2 faces a competitive labour market. Our result will hold even if firm 2 faces a unionised labour market but the union power faced by firm 2 is sufficiently lower than the union power faced by firm 1. We assume that the competitive wage in the foreign country is also c.
Few remarks are in order at this point. First, we consider the same competitive wages in both countries. Thus, we eliminate the incentive for technology licensing created by a lower competitive wage in the foreign country. Similarly, we eliminate the possibility of creating a higher consumer surplus due to a lower competitive wage in the foreign country. Hence, our result is not influenced by the differences in the competitive wages.
Second, like many other works on international technology licensing (see, e.g., Mottiner and Johnson, 2000, Kabiraj and Marjit, 2003, Mukherjee and Pennings, 2006 and Feess et al. 2009) we assume away foreign direct investment (FDI) by firm 1 due to an actual or perceived (e.g., due to political instability) high cost or risks associated with FDI.​[10]​ In other words, like other papers on international technology licensing, it is implicit in our analysis that licensing dominates other strategies such as FDI. It may worth pointing out that if the cost of FDI is not high, firm 1 would prefer to undertake FDI in the foreign country to bypass the unionised wage in the domestic country.​[11]​ However, the same competitive wages in both countries, as assumed in this paper, implies that FDI by firm 1 in the presence of a domestic labour union does not increase consumer surplus compared to the situation with no domestic labour union.
Third, following the literature on technology licensing (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Rockett, 1990, Kabiraj and Marjit, 2003, Mukherjee and Pennings, 2006, Sen and Tauman, 2007 and Yang and Maskus, 2009), we assume that firms 1 and 2 compete in the product-market ex-post technology licensing. Hence, we assume that firm 1 cannot commit credibly (maybe due to the problem of enforcing) that it will not sell in this market ex-post licensing. For example, firm 1 can invent around its initial technology and enter the market with a similar technology. Alternatively, firm 1 can register itself as a different firm and enter the market. If feasible, firm 1 prefers exclusive production by firm 2 ex-post licensing, since it does not increase competition in the product market and helps to bypass the domestic labour union. However, following the discussion in the last paragraph, it is immediate that the exclusive production by firm 2 does not increase consumer surplus in the presence of a domestic labour union compared to a competitive domestic labour market.
To show our results in the simplest way, we assume that there are no trade costs or costs related to technology licensing. We assume that the inverse world market demand function for the product is P = a – q, where P is price and q is the total output.
 In order to guarantee positive outputs, we assume that . We consider in this section that Firm 2 is not able to produce the good without firm 1’s technology, but if it gets the technology of firm 1, it competes with firm 1 like a Cournot duopolist with homogeneous products. We will relax this assumption in Section 4 and will assume that both firms have technologies to produce the product even if there is no technology transfer from firm 1 to firm 2.
We consider the following game. At stage 1, firm 1 decides whether or not to license its technology to firm 2. In case of licensing, firm 1 has the full bargaining power​[12]​ and offers a take-it-or-leave-it two-part tariff licensing contract with an up-front non-negative fixed-fee (F) and a non-negative per-unit output royalty (r).​[13]​ Firm 2 accepts the licensing contract if it is not worse off under licensing compared to no licensing. At stage 2, the wages are determined. The equilibrium wage in the domestic country is c under no labour union. If there is a domestic labour union, it determines wage, , to maximise its utility. The equilibrium wage in the foreign country is c. At stage 3, two firms determine their outputs simultaneously if licensing occurs. Otherwise, firm 1 produces like a monopolist. The profits are realised. We solve the game through backward induction.

3.1. No labour union in the domestic country
If there is no labour union in the domestic country, the equilibrium wages are c in both countries. In this situation, the monopolist, firm 1, has no incentive to license its technology. It is worth mentioning that firm 1 may prefer technology licensing in the absence of labour union if either the competitive wage in the foreign country is lower than that of in the domestic country, which we assume away to eliminate the consumer welfare improving effect of a lower foreign competitive wage, or there is a firm in the foreign country competing with firm 1, which we consider in the next section.
Firm 1 determines its output  to maximise its profit . Straightforward calculation gives the equilibrium consumer surplus as .

3.2. A labour union in the domestic country
Now assume that there is a labour union in the domestic country. As we show in Appendix A, the equilibrium per-unit royalty and fixed-fee in the technology licensing contract are  and  for , and  and  for . It can be demonstrated that, when , the equilibrium royalty rate decreases as the preference of the labour union for wage over employment increases. A higher weight on wage over employment induces the labour union to charge a relatively higher wage in equilibrium, which, in turn, induces firm 1 to shift more production to firm 2 by charging a less distortionary licensing contract, implying a lower royalty rate.
The equilibrium profit of firm 1 and consumer surplus are  and  for , but they are  and  for . Thus, we have  and  for , giving us the following proposition immediately.

Proposition 1: Compared to the situation with no labour union (or a competitive labour market), the presence of a domestic labour union (i) induces the monopolist producer to license its technology to a foreign non-unionised firm, with a fixed-fee licensing contract for  and with a two-part tariff licensing contract, involving a positive fixed-fee and a positive output royalty for , and (ii) makes the consumers better off.

The presence of a labour union (compared to no labour union) in the domestic country increases the marginal cost of firm 1, which induces firm 1 to shift its production to the foreign country. The shift of production to the foreign country from the domestic country has opposite effects on firm 1’s profit. On one hand, it creates a negative effect on firm 1’s profit by creating product-market competition. On the other hand, it creates positive effects on firm 1’s profit by reducing the domestic unionised wage as well as by bypassing the unionised wage for the amount produced by firm 2. Firm 1 creates a balance between these opposite effects by designing a suitable licensing contract with a fixed-fee and an output royalty. As the labour union’s preference for wage over employment increases, it creates a higher wage in the domestic country before licensing, thus increasing firm 1’s incentive to shift its production to firm 2. Hence, firm 1’s incentive for distorting the output of firm 2 through royalty decreases as the domestic labour union’s preference for wage over employment increases. As a result, the equilibrium licensing contract involves a fixed-fee and a royalty for , but only a fixed-fee for .
Irrespective of the equilibrium licensing contract, the technology transfer resulted from the presence of a labour union creates product-market competition and decreases firm 1’s marginal cost of production, leading to a higher total output and consumer surplus.
Since Proposition 1 holds for , it is immediate that our result holds even if the input supplier is not a labour union but a profit maximising input supplier. 
  
4. Duopoly market structure
We have shown in the previous section that the presence of a labour union induces a monopolist producer to license its technology to a foreign firm, while licensing does not occur in the absence of a labour union. Hence, licensing increases the number of producers in the previous section. We will show in this section that even if the number of firms remains the same in the presence and absence of labour union, and licensing occurs under both no labour union and labour union in the domestic country, the presence of a labour union may increase consumer surplus by creating a less distortionary licensing contract.
We assume in this section that both firms 1 and 2 considered in the previous section have technologies to produce the product. However, firm 1 has a better production technology than firm 2. As before, we assume that firm 1 needs  () workers to produce one unit of the output. However, firm 2 requires 1 worker to produce one unit of the output. Hence, labour productivity is lower in firm 2 compared to firm 1.
We consider the following game. At stage 1, firm 1 decides whether or not to license its technology to firm 2. In case of licensing, firm 1 has full bargaining power​[14]​ and offers a take-it-or-leave-it two-part tariff licensing contract with an up-front non-negative fixed-fee and a non-negative per-unit output royalty. Firm 2 accepts the licensing contract if it is not worse off under licensing compared to no licensing. At stage 2, the wages are determined. The equilibrium wage in the domestic country is c under no labour union. If there is a domestic labour union, it has full bargaining power​[15]​ and determines the wage, , to maximise its utility. The equilibrium wage in the foreign country is c. At stage 3, two firms determine their outputs simultaneously and the profits are realised. We solve the game through backward induction.
We assume in this section that  so that two firms always produce positive outputs.

4.1. No labour union in the domestic country
First, consider the case where labour markets in both countries are perfectly competitive. Hence, the equilibrium wages are c in both countries. As we show in Appendix B, firm 1 offers a licensing contract in which the equilibrium per-unit royalty and fixed-fee are  and  respectively. This implies that the unit costs of firm 2 are the same under licensing and no licensing, thus creating the same consumer surplus, , under licensing and no licensing. The equilibrium profit of firm 1 is  which is greater than that of under no licensing, indicating that, in the absence of a labour union, firm 1 always licenses its technology to firm 2 and charges an output royalty only. These results are similar to the existing literature on technology licensing with perfectly competitive input markets such as Rockett (1990) and Sen and Tauman (2007).


4.2. A labour union in the domestic country
Now we want to see the effects of a domestic labour union on the technology licensing contract and consumer surplus. 

4.2.1. Licensing contract
The following proposition follows from the calculations in Appendix C.

Proposition 2: In contrast to the royalty only licensing contract under no labour union (or a competitive labour market), the equilibrium licensing contracts in the presence of a domestic labour union are as follows: (a) Royalty only licensing contract for , (b) a two-part tariff licensing contract with a positive fixed-fee and a positive royalty for  , and (c) a licensing contract with fixed-fee only for .

The above result is in contrast to existing literature (see, e.g., Rockett, 1990 and Sen and Tauman, 2007) showing that the licenser offers a royalty only licensing contract in the case of a homogeneous duopoly with no imitation.
The reason for Proposition 2 is as follows. The asymmetric cost of production of the firms resulted from the presence of a domestic labour union may encourage firm 1 to adopt a less distortionary licensing contract. Firm 1’s marginal cost of production under licensing is , implying that technology licensing reduces firm 1’s marginal cost of production by  by reducing the wage charged by the domestic labour union. Hence, the royalty rate creates opposing effects on firm 1’s profits under licensing. On one hand, a lower royalty creates a negative effect on firm 1’s market share by making firm 2 more competitive in the product market. On the other hand, a lower royalty creates positive effects on firm 1’s profit by bypassing the unionised wage for the amount of production shifted from firm 1 to firm 2, and by reducing the domestic unionised wage. The positive effects increase with a higher . If  is high (), the positive effects outweigh firm 1’s loss of market share for a lower royalty rate, inducing firm 1 to charge a fixed-fee only licensing contract. If  is low (), firm 1’s loss of market share dominates the positive effects and induces firm 1 to charge a royalty only licensing contract. If  is moderate (), firm 1 charges both positive fixed-fee and positive royalty to balance these effects.

4.2.2. Consumer surplus
Since both firms always produce positive outputs, we can find that consumer surplus is positively related to the total output, which is negatively related to the total marginal costs of the firms (Varian, 1992). Hence, it is enough for us to compare the total marginal costs of two firms under “no labour union and licensing” and “labour union and licensing”.
Since the royalty rate under no labour union is , the total marginal costs of two firms under no labour union is .
The total marginal costs of two firms in the presence of labour union are  for ,  for , where , and  for .
Since , it is immediate that if firm 1 offers a royalty only licensing contract under both no labour union and labour union, which occurs for , the consumer surplus is higher under no labour union than under labour union.
Next, consider the other extreme case where firm 1 offers a royalty only licensing contract under no labour union but it offers a fixed-fee only licensing contract under labour union, which occurs for . We get that  or  if . We find that  and  if . Since the requirement for positive outputs implies that , the above discussion implies that consumer surplus is higher under labour union compared to no labour union if , ensuring , and .
Finally, consider the case where firm 1 offers a royalty only licensing contract under no labour union but it offers a two-part tariff licensing contract with a positive fixed-fee and a positive royalty in the presence of a domestic labour union. This happens for . We get that  or  at  but  or  at  if . Since the difference  is continuous and decreasing with respect to  over ,​[16]​ we get that if , there exists a  such that consumer surplus is higher under labour union compared to no labour union for .
The following proposition is immediate from the above discussion.

Proposition 3: Compared to the situation with no labour union (or a competitive labour market), the presence of a domestic labour union makes the consumers better off if  and .

The presence of a labour union may induce firm 1 to charge a less distortionary licensing contract depending on the union’s preference for wage over employment, as shown in Proposition 2. Thus, the presence of a labour union creates two opposing effects on the marginal costs of two firms. On one hand, it tends to increase the marginal cost of firm 1. On the other hand, it tends to reduce the marginal cost of firm 2 by inducing firm 1 to offer a less distortionary technology licensing contract to firm 2. Hence, the consumers are better off in the presence of a labour union compared to no labour union if the second effect dominates the first effect, which happens if the market size is not large (i.e., ) and the union’s preference for wage over employment is moderate (i.e., ).
Since the unionised wage increases with respect to the market size, a, if the market size is large, i.e. , the increase in firm 1’s marginal cost in the presence of a domestic labour union (compared to no labour union) is never less than the reduction in firm 2’s marginal cost. Hence, the presence of a domestic labour union makes the consumers worse off compared to no labour union if .
If , we get , implying that Proposition 3 holds for  and our result holds even if the input supplier is not a labour union but a profit maximising input supplier. 

5. Extensions of the models
5.1. Bargaining between licenser and licensee
So far we have assumed that firm 1 has full bargaining power under licensing. Now, we discuss how the results might be affected if a generalised Nash bargaining between the licenser and the licensee determines the royalty rate  and the fixed-fee . Like Section 4, assume that both firms exist in the market irrespective of licensing. The equilibrium r and F are determined by maximising the following expression: , where  and  stand for the respective optimal profits of the licenser and the licensee in the product market under licensing,  and   are the optimal profits of the licenser and the licensee respectively under no licensing and,  and  are the bargaining power of the licenser and the licensee respectively. Note that, since we are working with the reduced form functions, it is valid under all the previous situations, although the optimal values of the reduced form functions will be changed depending on the actual situation.
The above maximization problem yields the following first-order conditions:
,
.
Solving the above two equations, we find that the optimal royalty rate is given by
 subject to .
So, the optimal royalty rate is independent of the bargaining power of the firms. Hence, the analysis for licensing to firm 2 shown in Section 4 remains the same even under bargaining, which only lowers the amount of surplus firm 1 can extract through the fixed-fee.

5.2. Bargaining between labour union and firm
The wage effect of unionisation is softened when (i) the labour union’s preference for wage is low and/or (ii) the labour union’s bargaining power is low. We have examined the first case while assumed full bargaining power of the labour union. However, it must be clear that the implications of lower bargaining power of the labour union will be similar to our analysis with a lower preference for wage. We have shown that if the union’s preference for wage is very weak (i.e., if  is very small), it reduces the wage effect of unionisation that is responsible for different licensing contracts.  In the extreme case of , the equilibrium wage is equal to the reservation wage of the workers.
For a given preference for wage and employment, a lower bargaining power of the labour union will reduce the wage effect of unionisation. In the extreme case where firm 1 has full bargaining power, the equilibrium wage will be equal to the workers' reservation wage, irrespective of the labour union’s preference for employment and wage. Hence, if the bargaining power of the labour union is very small, one must expect qualitative results similar to low  in our analysis. If the labour union’s bargaining power increases, it increases the wage effect, and for a higher bargaining power of the union, one must expect results similar to our results for a higher .

6. Conclusion
It is generally believed that if the input supplier charges a linear price, market power of the input supplier increases the input price and the final goods price, thus making the consumers worse off compared to the situation with a competitive input market. We show in this paper that this view may not be correct if the final goods producers can adopt strategies to bypass market power of the input supplier.
Considering a monopolist final goods producer, we show that the presence of a labour union induces a monopolist producer to license its technology to a foreign firm, thus creating product-market competition and reducing the unionised wage. As a result, the presence of a labour union makes the consumers better off compared to the situation with no labour union (or a competitive labour market).
We further show that, in the case of a duopoly market structure, the presence of a labour union may make the consumers better off compared to a situation with no labour union by inducing the technologically efficient firm to charge a less distortionary technology licensing contract. In this situation, the presence of a labour union makes the consumers better off if the market size is not large and the labour union’s preference for wage over employment is moderate.













A. Monopolist with a labour union
A1. No licensing
If technology licensing does not occur, given the domestic unionised wage, w, firm 1 maximise its profit  to determine its output as . Accordingly, the labour demand in the domestic country is  so that the labour union maximises its utility to determine the wage as , which increases with . Thus, the equilibrium profit of firm 1 is .

A2. Licensing
If technology licensing occurs, given the domestic unionised wage, w, the profits of two firms at stage 3 are respectively  and , where , F is the up-front licensing fee and r is the per-unit output royalty.​[17]​
We get the equilibrium outputs of two firms as  and . Hence, at stage 2, the labour demand in the domestic country is  and the labour union maximises its utility to determine the wage as , which increases with  and .
At stage 1, firm 1 maximises the following expression to determine the equilibrium licensing contract:
                        (A1)
subject to                                                                                                           (A2)
                                                               (A3)
 and ,
where , , (A2) and (A3) are the participation constraints of firms 1 and 2 respectively.
Since firm 1 offers a take-it-or-leave-it licensing contract to firm 2, the equilibrium  is such that firm 2 earns the same net profits under licensing and no licensing. Hence, the equilibrium fixed-fee is .
Hence, (A1) reduces to
. 
We have the first order derivative of  with respect to  as follows.
.                                                   (A4)
It can be found from (A4) that the equilibrium non-negative per-unit royalty and fixed-fee in the technology licensing contract are  and  for , and  and  for .
The equilibrium outputs and profits of two firms, and consumer surplus are , , ,  and  for , but they are , , ,  and  for .

Appendix B. Duopoly without labour union
B1. No licensing
If firm 1 does not license its technology to firm 2, firms 1 and 2 determine their outputs simultaneously to maximise  and  respectively, where . Straightforward calculation gives the equilibrium profits of two firms as  and .

B2. Licensing
If technology licensing occurs, the profits of two firms at stage 3 are respectively  and . At stage 1, firm 1 maximises the following expression to determine the equilibrium licensing contract:
                                                              (B1)
subject to                                                                                                            (B2)
                                                                                     (B3)
 and ,
where , , (B2) and (B3) are the participation constraints of firms 1 and 2 respectively. It is obvious from (B3) that firm 2 will not accept the licensing contract if . Hence, the equilibrium royalty rate must satisfy .
Since firm 1 offers a take-it-or-leave-it licensing contract to firm 2, the equilibrium fixed-fee makes firm 2 indifferent under licensing and no licensing, giving us the equilibrium fixed-fee as .
Hence, (B1) reduces to
.
The first order derivative of  with respect to  is:
.                                                                                                      (B4)




Appendix C. Duopoly with a labour union
C1. No licensing
First, consider the case of no licensing under labour union where at stage 3, the marginal costs of firms 1 and 2 are  and  respectively. Hence, firms 1 and 2 determine their outputs simultaneously to maximise  and  respectively. We get the equilibrium outputs as  and . 
Hence, at stage 2, the labour demand in the domestic country is so that the domestic labour union maximises its utility to determine the wage as , which increases with . The equilibrium profits of the licenser and the licensee are  and  respectively under no licensing.

C2. Licensing
The stages 2 and 3 are similar to those in Appendix A. Hence, at stage 1, firm 1 maximises the following expression to determine the equilibrium licensing contract:
                        (C1)
subject to                                                                                                            (C2)
                                                            (C3)
 and ,
where , , (C2) and (C3) are the participation constraints of firms 1 and 2 respectively. It is obvious from (C3) that firm 2 will not accept the licensing contract if . Hence, the equilibrium royalty rate must satisfy .
Since firm 1 offers a take-it-or-leave-it licensing contract to firm 2, the equilibrium fixed-fee that makes firm 2 indifferent between licensing and no licensing is .
Hence, (C1) reduces to

We have the first order derivative of  with respect to  as follows:
    
We get  for , implying that the equilibrium royalty is  for . Hence, a fixed-fee licensing occurs for  and the equilibrium fixed-fee is . The profit of firm 1 under licensing is   which is greater than under no licensing.
If , the equilibrium output royalty is  for
                                                                                (C4)
but it is  if (C4) does not hold. We get that (C4) holds for , where .​[18]​ Hence, if , the equilibrium royalty is , the  equilibrium fixed-fee is  and the equilibrium profit of firm 1 is , which is  greater than firm 1’s profit under no licensing.
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^1	  Linear pricing and two-part tariff are two important forms of contracts considered in the literature on vertical pricing. Our paper falls in the area of the extant literature considering linear vertical pricing. A seminal contribution with linear vertical pricing is by Ordover et al. (1990). For more recent contributions, one may look at Normann (2009) and the references therein. While the justification for two-part tariff contracts can be found in Tirole (1988), some plausible justifications for linear pricing can be found in Tyagi (1999), Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) and Milliou et al. (2009). 
^2	  Our results are based on a two-country model where the foreign labour market is perfectly competitive. In fact, other things being equal, it is more profitable for a patentee to license its technology to a foreign firm facing a perfectly competitive labour market than to a domestic firm facing an unionised domestic labour market. One may see, e.g., Bughin and Vannini (1995), Straume (2003) and Mukherjee (2008), for some other works with unionised and non-unionised labour markets in a two-country model. In reality, a large number of technologies are transferred from countries with labour unions to countries with no labour unions. For example, Chinese industries, which are effectively non-unionised industries (Metcalf and Li, 2005), receive a large number of technologies from other countries with labour unions. The appendix table 6-24 in Science and Engineering Indicators 2008 shows that U.S. receipt of royalties and license fees generated from exchange and use of manufacturing know-how with unaffiliated Chinese companies is 198 millions of U.S. Dollars in 2005. At the firm level, we can find that there is a significant amount of technology transfer between Nokia and China’s Huawei (http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/29/nokia-huawei-idUSLR21747220080929). 
^3	  Even if the labour market is competitive, there can be reasons for licensing by a monopolist producer. For example, network externality (Economides, 1993), product differentiation (Wang and Yang, 1999, Mukherjee and Balasubramanian, 2001, Wang, 2002 and Faulí-Oller and Sandonis, 2002), strategic tariff policy (Mukherjee and Pennings, 2006) can induce technology licensing by a monopolist producer in an economy with a competitive labour market. We ignore all these aspects in our analysis.
^4	  See Inderst and Wey (2003) for an alternative argument against higher buyer power. They suggest that higher bargaining power may not be desirable if it reduces the suppliers’ investment incentives.
^5	  Mukherjee and Pennings (2006) extended Kabiraj and Marjit (2003) to show whether a foreign firm prefers to license the technology either to another foreign firm or to a domestic firm in the presence of trade policies.
^6	  Empirical evidence shows that technology transfer occurs under different types of licensing contracts. For example, Rostoker (1984) shows that licensing contracts differ significantly among the firms: up-front fixed-fee alone was used for 13%, output royalty alone for 39% and the combination of fixed-fee and royalty for 46% of the time. More recently, Macho-Stadler et al. (1996) find, using Spanish data, that 59% of the contracts have output royalty alone, 13% include both royalty and fixed fee and 28% present a fixed fee alone.  Our analysis shows that the presence of the labour union as well as the labour union’s preference over wage and employment may be responsible for different types of licensing contracts. Hence, our reason for different licensing contracts is different from the existing reasons such as imitation (Rockett, 1990), asymmetric information or uncertainty (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Bousquet et. al., 1998), product differentiation (Mukherjee and Balasubramanian, 2001; Faulí-Oller and Sandonís, 2002), transportation cost of exporting (Mukherjee, 2007), the number of firms (Sen and Tauman, 2007) and asymmetric costs of production (Poddar and Sinha, 2010).
^7	   We thank an anonymous referee for highlighting the comparison between our paper, Kabiraj and Marjit (2003) and Poddar and Sinha (2003).
^8	  We will discuss the implications of wage bargaining between firm 1 and the labour union in Section 5.
^9	  The equilibrium values will be similar if we consider a positive monotonic transformation of the union utility and assume that the union utility is . If , the transformed union utility is , which is equal to the objective function of a profit maximising input supplier.
^10	  Many studies (see, e.g., Buckley and Casson,1981; Smith, 1987; Horstmann and Markusen, 1987; Horstmann and Markusen, 1992; Motta, 1992) have recognised that FDI is costly because it requires the firm to build a new production facility.
^11	  See Mukherjee and Suetrong (2012) for a recent paper showing the effects of domestic labour unions on outward FDI.
^12	  We will discuss bargaining between two firms in Section 5.
^13	  The non-negativity constraints on the fixed-fee and output royalty follow the tradition of the technology licensing literature and may be motivated by the antitrust requirement (see, e.g., Rockett, 1990, Faulí-Oller and Sandonis, 2002 and Mukherjee and Pennings, 2006).
^14	  We will discuss bargaining between two firms later.
^15	  We will discuss the implications of wage bargaining between firm 1 and the labour union later.
^16	   for .
^17	   For simplicity, we assume away any cost associated with technology licensing. It is trivial that a prohibitive cost of technology licensing will make it an unfeasible option. However, our results will hold for a non-prohibitive cost of technology licensing.   
^18	  It is easy to check that (12) holds for  but it does not hold for . Since (12) is continuous in  , it is immediate that there exists a  such that (12) holds for .  
